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UNION INFLUENCE IN POST-SOCIALIST EUROPE
RICHARD CROUCHER AND MARIAN RIZOV*
Examining enterprise-level union influence in post-socialist coun-
tries, the authors hypothesize that calculative human resource man-
agement (HRM) is more strongly associated with low levels of union
influence than collaborative HRM. Using the United Kingdom as a
benchmark, they find that in the countries under study, calculative
HRM is indeed more damaging to union influence than collabora-
tive, although to a much lesser extent than in the United Kingdom.
They also find that union influence corresponds to enterprise union
density and is most apparent when the business cycle is unfavorable;
they explain their findings by reference to East European members'
continued attachment to unionism for nonbargaining reasons.
We examine enterprise-level union influence in post-socialist countries(PSCs), and seek to discover its antecedents. Research on union influ-
ence at the enterprise level in post-socialist Europe is sparse, despite the fact
that unions retain highly decentralized structures and funds. Yet influential
unions are more likely to provide a solid basis for the European Union (EU)
social dialogue processes; conversely, unions at this level that are not influ-
ential may eventually erode the European model. We find that union den-
sity, collaborative HRM, and the business cycle are all significant antecedents
of union influence and that previous national-level estimates are a useful
but imprecise guide to enterprise-level influence.
Management and Unions before 1989
Many researchers suggest (Vos 2006; Knell and Srholec 2007; Meardi 2007a,
2007b; Woolfson 2007; Trif 2008) that soviet management legacies remain
influential in PSCs. Labor management, like unions, had a major political
role within the socialist system (T'ung and Havlovic 1996), and this empha-
sized the need to build socialism through efficient production (Kornai
1992). Unions were part of enterprise management. Little importance was
accorded to the personnel function, which consisted of selection, discipline
and, to some extent, training (Tung and Havlovic 1996). Although the per-
sonnel function is now widely referred to as HRM, it often has no strategic
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role. In many PSCs much of this management system remains (Brewster,
Mayrhofer, and Morley 2005).
Trade unionism is still marked by the communist experience (Soulsby
and Clark 2007; Noelke and Vliegenthart 2009); union roles may in some
countries still be filled by managers (Trif 2008). Pre-1989 union functions
were essentially corporatist: to integrate and motivate workers. Unions also
had major political roles as transmission belts for Communist policy, which
currendy creates legitimacy problems (Meardi 2006). Although they ac-
quired minor representational functions under communism (Kornai 1992),
they also had large legal departments which remain important in many
unions (Trif 2005; Meardi 2006). Membership was compulsory, and unions
stood largely aloof from workers' informal bargaining over piece rates
(Haraszti 1978). They had important welfare functions and allocated re-
sources to providing workers vnth holidays for themselves and their families,
housing, and money when they had particular needs. Workers were encour-
aged to identify with the labor collective, an ideological construct acquiring
concrete reality through collective workplace events and the union itself.
Current union membership can reflect continuing identification with these
functions even though union resources in the weliFare area are much dimin-
ished and no longer include housing (Trif 2005). The social movement
unionism that emerged in some countries before 1989 was superimposed
on this situation.
Trade Unions since 1989
Before 1989 union influence was simply exercised, if at all, as part of the
management function. When a market system began to be implemented,
this disappeared: management was then influenced by their perceptions of
unions' capacity to mobilize their members. We term this direct union influ-
ence. Unions, however, might also retain some influence through their ca-
pacity to shape members' views and hence their levels of commitment to
management initiatives. Their legal watchdog role may also allow pressure
to be put on management. We call these forms indirect influence because
they are less reliant on mobilization capacity. The basis for this is in mem-
bers' perceptions of union functions. Indirect influence is likely to be stron-
ger in the PSCs than elsewhere, where union bargaining functions are more
central. In short, unions may have either direct or indirect influence; and
management may use the latter to shape a form of unionism that presents
litde challenge to management prerogative.
PSCs have been strongly exposed to global markets and financial institu-
tions, bringing mass privatization, unemployment, and a shift away from
full-time permanent employment (Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Baranowska
and Cebel 2008; Psychogios, Szamosi, and Wood 2010; Williams 2010).
Workers are therefore invariably in weak positions, except where skill short-
ages exist, and this weakness is reflected in unions' low mobilization capac-
ity (Psychogios et al. 2010). Their direct influence is therefore weak.
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Initially, in 1989 and 1990, unions were seen as a possible focus for social
unrest, likely to defend privileges accorded the working class under commu-
nism. In that brief period, they were brought into tripartite discussion (Ca-
sale 1999). Yet governments gradually set tripartism aside, giving way to a
long period of neoliberal-inspired legislation and employer hostility. The
international financial institutions insisted on labor market reform and ex-
plicidy linked it to a need to reduce union influence (Ciacobbe-Miller,
Miller, and Victorov 1998).^  By the mid-2000s, discussion centered on unions'
incapacity to act as credible social partners within the EU (Meardi 2006).
PSCs show considerable diversity, but they share common features that
corrode union membership and influence. EU legislation and influence
have had liberalizing effects (Woolfson 2007; Meardi 2007b), although
some suggest that EU influence simply reproduces j&nor levels of joint regu-
lation (Trif 2008). Wage bargaining is often decentralized and in some
countries may be conducted by employee representatives instead of unions;
works councils, where they exist, have only weak consultation powers, and
industrial action is rare (ILO 2000; Eunk and Lesch 2004). In the one coun-
try with a relatively strong union movement, Slovenia, tripartism has oper-
ated successfully since the mid-1990s (Erail 2009). Elsewhere, experts judge
unions to be much weaker (Mailand and Due 2004; to compare this judg-
ment with the ILO view, see Dimitrova and Vilrokx 2005). National-level
tripartism is much less effective than in Western Europe because it was insti-
tuted through a top-down process (Mailand and Due 2004). Ost (2000) de-
scribes it as "illusory corporatism": driven by new elites, it serves their
liberalizing purposes. While these arrangements give formal voice to unions,
Ost argues that labor is complicit in a process that diminishes its own influ-
ence. Outside sectors protected from competition, many unions are too
weak to insist on observance of any agreement, much less to bargain supple-
ments to national agreements as legally permitted in Romania (Trif 2005;
EFILWC 2009). Enterprise agreements on occasion specify worse terms and
conditions than legal minima (Bernaciak, Duman, and Scepanovic 2010).
Most national union density estimates fall between 16% and 22% (for
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and, at
either extreme, Slovenia at 44% and Estonia at 7.6% (EIRO 2010). Slove-
nian strength and Baltic weakness are reflected in other findings in terms of
union wider capacities (Buchen 2007; Stockhammer and Onaran 2009),
their ability to conduct social dialogue (Mailand and Due 2004), to carry
out extrajudicial action (Welz and Kauppinen 2005), and to defend women
members (Poliert 2005).
'In several studies the elimination of labor hoarding is identified as an important (necessai-y) compo-
nent of enterprise restructuring policies promoted by international financial institutions. Another im-
portant (sufficient) component is new investment in productive assets rather than using funds for
enterprise surNnval. The success of restructuring policies is conditional on eliminating soft budget con-
straints (Konings, Rizov, and Vandenbussche 2003; Rizov 2005), directly linked to abandoning the state's
role in ensuring full employment.
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After 1990 unions made efforts to become more mobilizing and bargain-
ing bodies (Gennard 2007; Croucher and Cotton 2009). Yet extensive quali-
tative functional change has proved difficult, and because of mixed verdicts
from experts, it remains unclear how far their efforts have succeeded.
Thirkell, Petkov, and Vickerstaff (1998) cited MSzOSz in Hungary and
CITUB in Bulgaria as reformed federations that were stronger than they
had been before 1999. Gennard (2007), analyzing print unions' positions,
passed a more qualified judgment. Crowley (2004) went further, arguing
that many unions remained unreformed, which helped to explain labor qui-
escence, while King (2007) characterized Central European unions as
highly ineffective.
Unions at the enterprise level may have certain limited resources to but-
tress their influence. First, high union density may provide representative
legitimacy and underpin some prospect of direct influence (Vernon 2006).
Second, management can concede union influence to help them effect
change (Crowley 2004; Croucher 2010). This may be buttressed by the legal
watchdog role, union welfare functions and continued identification with it
as an institutional embodiment of the "labor collective." The legal watchdog
role acquires particular significance where relatively strong worker protec-
tion remains in place, as in some countries (Trif 2005). Finally, they may
exercise indirect influence on management by diffusing discontent on the
shop floor (Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne 1994).
Forms of HRM
HRM is used by Western companies, to some extent by private companies,
and even occasionally in the state sector (Brewster et al. 2005). Forms of
HRM all emphasize alignment of employer and employee interests, but vary
considerably Gooderham, Nordhaug, and Ringdal (1999, 2006) identified
two forms that broadly reflect, on the one hand, American and, on the
other. West European approaches: calculativeznd collaborativetíRM. Calcula-
tive HRM treats labor as an abstract factor of production, stressing individu-
alized reward, appraisal, and employee development monitoring systems.
Collaborative approaches have a more humanistic orientation, viewing em-
ployees as active partners, and emphasizing intensive downward communi-
cation with employees at all levels (Gooderham et al. 1999). Collaborative
approaches are part of relational policies (Gospel and Pendleton 2005)
and, as Gooderham et al. 1999 acknowledge, have much in common with
soft HRM (Storey 2001). The Gooderham et al. typology does not reflect a
full set of soft HRM practices; the soft characterization explicitly includes a
relatively positive attitude to unionization.
We adopt this conceptualization because it captures two paradigmatic
sets of practices. We prefer the Gooderham et al. conceptualization to the
vaguer, normative or prescriptive hard and soft HRM dichotomy (see, for
example. Storey 2001). Also unlike the hard and soft conceptualization, the
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Gooderham et al. typology has the advantage that it treats unions as exoge-
nous, and there is therefore no problem of endogeneity in measurement.
Calculative HRM is the form usually adopted by private companies in the
PSCs. It allows and reflects, as the concept's authors explain, higher levels of
management choice. Cooderham et al. (1999) argue that calculative HRM
is strongly linked to managements' wish to increase their autonomy and
scope for initiative. Individualized pay systems have been adopted and pro-
moted to other companies by multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs
operate in the PSCs (EFILWC 2009). Cooderham et al. (1999) suggest that
calculative HRM is closely associated with reduced union influence in West-
ern Europe; unions resist it, but they don't resist the collaborative form.
This is because it is based on a negative view of collective representation and
emphasizes individual assessment and reward. This may also have an effect
in the PSCs, both by concrete results, such as reducing the material signifi-
cance of collective bargaining, and also in a less direct way by sending the
message to employees that collective institutions are unwelcome.
In the PSCs, however, both union functions and members' perceptions of
what these should be are fundamentally different from those in much of the
rest of the world. In other societies, and especially in the liberal market
economies, we would not expect welfare and affective considerations to
have similar relevance. In our analysis, therefore, we include the United
Kingdom as a benchmark, since we expect calculative HRM to have a
marked negative effect on union influence there, as Gooderham et al.'s the-
ory predicts.
We therefore propose the hypothesis: InPSGs, calculative HRM is associated
with lower union influence than the collaborative form, but less so than in the United
Kingdom benchmark.
Data and Variables
Our data derive from the 2003-4 round of Cranet, an international enter-
prise-level survey of HRM practices conducted at regular intervals since
1989 across a large number of countries by a well-established international
research network. Cranet is by far the most comprehensive international
survey of HR policies and practices at the organizational level. The survey
encompasses all areas of economic activity, but it excludes firms employing
fewer than 100 staff and targets organizations employing more than 200.
Respondent firms are chosen to reflect the broad industrial composition by
employment within each country surveyed. It covers private and public
organizations in 22 European countries, as well as some dozen others
(Brewster et al. 2005). It is directed at HR managers or, in the absence of
an HR manager, the senior manager responsible for HR issues, and it uses
predominandy closed questions on policies and practices rather than atti-
tudes. This ensures unambiguous responses on actual policies and practices.
The quesdons are agreed on by members of the network, translated into the
appropriate language, and then translated back into English to identify any
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problems with international meaning and comparability. In the countries
involved in our sample, the survey was administered by mail. Data collection
in these countries poses considerable and specific difficulties (Drzewiecka
2007). There is a tradition of secrecy among managers (Danilovich and
Croucher 2011), which can be partially overcome by using local researchers
in each country. Full technical details are available in Brewster et al. (2005).
We use data from all the PSCs for which data are available (Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and, as our lib-
eral market economy benchmark, from the United Kingdom. These coun-
tries exhibit diverse institutional settings, and they include a Balkan country
(Bulgaria) as well as a Baltic one (Estonia) and a group of significant Cen-
tral European economies. All are members of the EU. We also include in
our sample firms that are part of multinational companies (MNCs). The
incidence of MNCs in our sample exhibits a pattern consistent with aggre-
gate statistics on MNCs' presence in the region (WIIW 2003).
Our main dependent variable is union influence at the firm level ( TUIN),
measured as a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when managers re-
ported some union influence and 0 otherwise. We asked managers if union
influence has increased, decreased, or remained the same over the previous
three years, or if no union influence existed. We classify the first three cate-
gories as "some influence" and the last as "no influence." We believe that
treating the question in this way provided reliable information; we experi-
mentally redefined the variable by excluding the decreased category, but
the results, available on request, remained qualitatively the same. Using
these data, it is impossible to distinguish between direct and indirect influ-
ence, as we do on the theoretical level. We also analyze unions' presence
( TUPR) in firms and measure this on a scale with six categories according to
the share of firm employees in union membership.^ Verma, Kochan, and
Wood (2002) argue that union density is the best overall indicator of union
influence. Thus, by using both TUIN and TUPR, we believe that we achieve
the most reliable indication of whether union influence exists. Table 1 dem-
onstrates the high correlations (Pearson correlation coefficients) of TUIN
and TUPR both by country and for the total PSCs and United Kingdom
samples.
In extended regressions, we use two measures of the two major types of
labor management practices as formulated by Gooderham et al. (1998,
1999), calculative HRM {GAEQ and collaborative HRM {GOLE) as control
variables. We augment the collaborative HRM measure with group practice
components following Rizov and Croucher (2009). The calculative HRM
measure is also augmented by our use of a compulsory redundancy compo-
nent. We note that in this analysis we use CALC and GOEE to control for the
impact of HRM practices on union influence, rather than study the prac-
tices themselves in depth. Composite scales are used for GALG and GOEE,
^The six categories are defined as follows: category 0 corresponds to 0% share, 1 to l%-10% share, 2
to ll%-25% share, 3 to 26%-50% share, 4 to 51%-75% share, and 5 to 76%-100% share.
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Table 1. Correlation of Union Influetice (TUIN) and Presence (TUPR)
in the PSCs and the United Kingdom
Czech Total
Bulgaria Hungary Estonia Slovenia Slovakia Republic PSCs U.K.
Correlation coefficient 0.64 0.85 0.66 0.68 0.80 0.70 0.76 0.70
Note. All (Pearson) correlation coefficients are significant at the p= 0.001 level.
comprising indicators of HRM practices of 15 and 13 components, respec-
tively. In identifying the components of each scale we pay attention to the
contexts of both the PSCs and the United Kingdom.
The CALC scale is a composite of indicators for base and variable pay that
are directly related to performance for all employee categories, regular for-
mal appraisal for managers, professionals, clerical, and manual workers, use
of formal appraisal in informing career and pay decisions as well as use of
compulsory redundancies. We were unable to reproduce all of the original
Gooderham et al. calculative scale because the two items on monitoring
training effectiveness were not used in the 2004 questionnaire; however, it
seems likely that the use of the appraisals questions may to some extent
mitigate this issue.
The COLL scale comprises indicators for formal strategy briefings of all
categories of employees and the presence of a written mission and corpo-
rate values statement, extended by measures for minority inclusion, career
development through team work, the presence of mechanisms for two-way
communication at team level, and the existence of a works council or joint
consultative committee.
Each HRM indicator is an ordinal categorical variable. We apply Mok-
ken's nonparametric scaling model (Mokken and Lewis 1982) to compute
our synthetic HRM indices as did Gooderham et al. (1999). The unweighted
sum of item scores must be monotonously related to the latent true scores,
as demonstrated by Sjitsma, Debets, and Molenaar (1990). This implies that
Mokken's model provides only estimates of the scale scores at ordinal level.
The primary scaling criterion is Loevinger's H-coefficient of homogeneity.
A set of items constitutes a scale if the aggregate has an H-value exceeding
0.30; values above 0.50 indicate strong scales. The consistency of the scales
is also verified by Cronbach's Alpha, which increases as the intercorrelations
among scale items increase and is thus an internal consistency estimate of the
scale's reliability. Because intercorrelations among test items are maximized,
when all items measure the same construct, Cronbach's Alpha is taken as in-
direcdy indicating the degree to which a set of items measures a single uni-
dimensional latent construct. Alpha values above 0.70 indicate a strong
scale. Details of the items included in the scales, results of the scaling, and
our reliability analysis are reported in the Appendix, Tables A.la and A.lb
for the PSC and U.K. samples, respectively.
In Table 2 we report for all PSCs in our sample by country summary statis-
tics on union influence, MNC presence (measured as a share of surveyed
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Table 2. Union Influence, Ownership, and HRM Practices in the PSCs
TUIN Mm PRJV CALC COLL
Bulgaria 0.58(0.49) 0.17(0.38) 0.64(0.48) 0.56(0.30) 0.47(0.31)
Czech Republic 0.82 (0.39) 0.22 (0.42) 0.86 (0.35) 0.74 (0.26) 0.78 (0.25)
Estonia 0.38 (0.49) 0.15 (0.35) 0.62 (0.49) 0.44 (0.29) 0.68 (0.27)
Hungary 0.60 (0.49) 0.27 (0.44) 0.62 (0.49) 0.50 (0.30) 0.61 (0.32)
Slovakia 0.55 (0.50) 0.20 (0.40) 0.82 (0.39) 0.56 (0.29) 0.58 (0.29)
Slovenia 0.91 (0.29) 0.12 (0.30) 0.63 (0.48) 0.70 (0.27) 0.67 (0.27)
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported. CALC and COLL indices
are normalized to the inten-al [0, 1]. Abbrexiations: TUIN, union influence; MNC, multina-
tional firm; PRA', private firm; CALC, calculative HRM; COLL, collaborative HRM.
firms), the importance of private ownership, and the prevalence of calcula-
tive and collaborative HRM practices. The summary statistics confirm that
our data approximate to the empirical facts established by other studies
using different data sources.
Eollowing the conceptual frameworks of Cooderham et al. (1998, 1999)
and of Rizov and Croucher (2009), we control in our regression analysis for
firm characteristics affecting union influence and the prevalence of HRM
practices. These are log of firm size {Eirm size), log of firm age {Eirm age),
and a dummy variable indicating private ownership {Private firm). In all re-
gressions a control dummy variable for foreign ownership and management
in large organizations is also included {Multinational firm). Market condi-
tions are controlled for by a three-step ordinal scale indicating whether the
firm's market is declining, steady, or growing {Business cycle). Industrial sec-
tor information, a set of industry dummy variables {Primary industries, Manu-
facturing, and Construction), is included in extended regression specifications
{Services is, the reference category). Einally, we capture cross-country differ-
ences with country dummy variables used in extended regression specifica-
tions to control for variations in institutional settings. Summary statistics
and short definitions of all regression variables are reported in Table 3. Cor-
relation matrices for selected regression variables are presented in the on-
line version of the paper (Tables A.2a and A.2b for PSCs and U.K. samples,
respectively) on http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/8038/. The low correlations be-
tween regression variables indicate no endogeneity problems.
Econometric Analysis
Determinants of Union Influence
Given that the dependent variable of main interest (union influence) is di-
chotomous we first estimate relationships by a probit regression and report
the estimation results (marginal effects) in Table 4a for the PSCs and in
Table 4b for the United Kingdom. Eollowing Gooderham et al. (1999) and
Rizov and Croucher (2009), we start with a base specification in which the
explanatory variables are simply the main firm characteristics. In a second
extended specification we add information on private and foreign ownership.
638 ILRREVIEW
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Variable Definition PSGs U.K.
TUIN Union influence dummy variable equal to 1 and 0 otherwise
TUPR Union presence scale ranging between 0 and 5 (low-high)
CALC Calculative HRM composite scale ranging between 0 and 15
COLL Collaborative HRM composite scale ranging between 0 and 13
Eirm size Log of firm size (total labor force)
Eirm age Log of firm age (years)
Multinational Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is a foreign multinational
firm (MNC) and 0 othenvise
Private firm Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is private and 0 otherwise
Business cycle Scale of business cycle conditions ranging between 1 and 3
(recession-expansion)
Primary industries Dummy variable which is 1 for primary industries and 0 other-
wise
Manufacturing Dummy variable which is 1 for manufacturing and 0 otherwise
Construction Dummy variable which is 1 for construction and 0 otherwise
Sei-vices Dummy variable which is 1 for services retail and wholesales
and 0 otherwise
Bulgaria Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is in Bulgaria and 0 oth-
envise
Czech Republic Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is in Czech Republic and
0 otherwise
Hungary Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is in Hungary and 0 oth-
erwise
Estonia Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is in Estonia and 0 other-
wise
Slovakia Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is in Slovakia and 0 oth-
envise
Slovenia Dummy variable which is 1 if the firm is in Slovenia and 0 oth-
envise
Note: Means and standard delations (in parentheses) are reported. Number of observations used in
calculating summary statistics is 747 for PSC sample and 800 for the United Kingdom.
Next, the specification (in Table 4a) also includes a set of PSCs dummy vari-
ables that capture variations in institutional specificities across countries,
with reference to the Czech Republic. We further extend the specification
with a measure of market conditions and subsequentiy add a set of industry
dummy variables with aggregate services as the reference category. The sta-
bility of coefficients in all regressions when introducing stepwise explanatory
variables indicates no endogeneity problems.^ Nevertheless, we are cautious
in drawing conclusions regarding causality and interpret our results simply
0.63
(0.37)
2.13
(1.26)
8.86
(2.92)
7.21
(2.95)
5.78
(1.23)
2.83
(1.03)
0.16
(0.37)
0.70
(0.46)
2.38
(0.68)
0.10
(0.30)
0.23
(0.42)
0.04
(0.19)
0.63
(0.84)
0.18
(0.38)
0.08
(0.28)
0.11
(0.32)
0.14
(0.34)
0.30
(0.46)
0.19
(0.39)
0.64
(0.48)
1.90
(1.67)
7.94
(3.27)
8.38
(2.63)
6.46
(1.28)
3.54
(1.13)
0.14
(0.35)
0.70
(0.46)
2.28
(0.75)
0.03
(0.18)
0.31
(0.46)
0.03
(0.18)
0.51
(0.50)
'In all regressions we have included variables describing key respondent characteristics to control for
a possible measurement error due to self-reporting. The individual-level control variables are gender,
education, and years of service in the organization, and we assume that they are not correlated with the
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Table 4a. Determinants of Union Influence (TUIN) in the PSCs (probit estimator)
Variabtes
Firm size
Firm age
Multinational firm
Private firm
Bulgaria
Hungaiy
Estonia
Slovenia
Slovakia
Business cycle
Primai"y industries
Manufacturing
Construction
COLL
CALC
Pseudo R_squared
Number obsen'ations
•1)
0.165***
(0.018)
0.094***
(0.019)
0.21
747
(2)
0.175***
(0.018)
0 077 ***
(0.020)
-0.166***
(0.054)
-0.152***
(0.042)
0.28
747
Models
(3)
0.166***
(0.020)
0.062 ***
(0.021)
-0.155***
(0.056)
-0.179***
(0.042)
-0.331***
(0.086)
-0.201**
(0.097)
-0.379***
(0.088)
0.153*
(0.077)
-0.093
(0.082)
0.40
747
(4)
0.170***
(0.020)
0.056 ***
(0.021)
-0.145***
(0.056)
-0.162***
(0.043)
-0.320***
(0.087)
-0.194**
(0.097)
-0.374***
(0.088)
0.158*
(0.077)
-0.086
(0.082)
-0.088***
(0.030)
0.41
747
(5)
0.153***
(0.020)
0.056 ***
(0.021)
-0.161***
(0.057)
-0.170***
(0.046)
-0.330***
(0.089)
-0.195**
(0.099)
-0.369***
(0.090)
0.160*
(0.078)
-0.094
(0.083)
-0.070**
(0.030)
0.185***
(0.052)
0.113***
(0.044)
0.088
(0.082)
0.46
747
(6)
0.149***
(0.021)
0.055***
(0.021)
-0.164***
(0.058)
-0.164***
(0.046)
-0.310***
(0.092)
-0.196**
(0.099)
-0.399***
(0.089)
0.143*
(0.079)
-0.085
(0.083)
-0.074**
(0.031)
0.176***
(0.053)
0.112***
(0.044)
0.080
(0.083)
0.103**
(0.050)
-0.116*
(0.067)
0.49
747
Notes: Coefficients reported represent marginal effects. Reference country is Czech Republic, and refer-
ence industr)' is Services. Level of significance of estimated coefficients is indicated as follows: 1%***,
5%**, 10%*. COLL and CALC HRM scales are in logs.
as evidence of correlations between variables. We conceptualize the results
as showing a mutually determined relationship; since management clearly
has control, its policies are of great significance, but union policies and prac-
tices are also likely to have some impact on the relationships.
Comparing overall results for the United Kingdom and the PSCs, the
effects' signs are the same, except for the Multinational firm vaÚ2Lhle; how-
ever, for some variables the level of significance is higher and the coeffi-
cients' magnitudes appear larger for the PSCs sample.^ Eor the PSC sample,
firm size and age have positive and statistically significant impacts on union
firm-level variables. Individual-level controls were neither individually nor jointly statistically significant
in any regression, and therefore their coefficients were not reported.
••We test for differences in coefficients for the PSC and U.K. samples using Wald tests and find that
jointly for all coefficients the differences are significant at 10% level or better for the majority of the
models.
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Table 4b. Determinants of Union Influence (TUIN) in the
United Kingdom (probit estimator)
Variables
Firm size
Firm age
Multinational firm
Private firm
Business cycle
Primary industries
Manufacturing
Construction
COLL
CALC
Pseudo R_squared
Number obser\'ations
(1)
0.120***
(0.015)
0.033**
(0.016)
0.15
800
(2)
0.117***
(0.016)
0.031**
(0.016)
0.063
(0.046)
-0.275***
(0.034)
0.21
800
Models
(3)
0.118***
(0.016)
0.031**
(0.016)
0.059
(0.047)
-0.285***
(0.034)
-0.033
(0.023)
0.21
800
(4)
0.118***
(0.016)
0.026
(0.016)
0.043
(0.048)
-0.346***
(0.033)
-0.026
(0.024)
0.202***
(0.064)
0.243***
(0.036)
0.082
(0.087)
0.26
800
(5)
0.116***
(0.016)
0.020
(0.017)
0.055
(0.047)
-0.285**
(0.038)
-0.024
(0.024)
0.199***
(0.060)
0.228***
(0.036)
0.082
(0.082)
0.243***
(0.050)
-0.306***
(0.054)
0.32
800
Notes: Coefficients reported represent marginal effects. Reference industry is Sen'ices.
Level of significance of estimated coefficients is indicated as follows: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*.
COLL and CALC HRM scales are in logs.
influence. Union influence, however, is significantly statistically weaker in
foreign-owned and private firms. Using the Czech Republic as the reference
country, firms in Bulgaria, Htmgary, and Estonia are characterized by weaker
union influence. In Slovenia, union influence is, as expected, stronger while
influence in Slovakia is similar to that in the Czech Republic. All the results
are consistent with other researchers' national findings and remain robust
when we control for business cycle and market conditions.
Significantly, the business cycle is negatively correlated with union influ-
ence in PSCs: In periods of favorable market conditions influence is low but
increases vihen the business cycle moves unfavorably. Adding a set of industry
controls reproduces the results from previous specifications and also sug-
gests important differences across industries. Given aggregate services as a
reference category, union influence is stronger in primary industries and
manufacturing, while in the construction sector it is similar to services.
Finally, we extend the last specification, considering the association of
HRM with union influence and report our results in Table 4a, column 6,
and Table 4b, column 5, for the PSCs and the U.K. samples, respectively.
Interestingly, the two HRM scales' coefficients exhibit the same pattern but
differ in magnitudes for the two samples as verified by Wald tests, which are
significant at 5% level. For the PSC sample the coefficients of GOEE and
GAEG are smaller in magnitude, confirming the expectations we have dis-
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Table 5a. Determinants of Union Influence in the PSCs (SUR estimator)
Variables
Firm size
Firm age
Multinational firm
Private firm
Bulgaria
Hungary
Estonia
Slovenia
Slovakia
Business cycle
Primary industries
Manufacturing
Construction
R_squared
Number observations
(1)
0.136***
(0.013)
0.080***
(0.016)
0.23
747
(2)
0.138***
(0.013)
0.067***
(0.016)
-0.140***
(0.044)
-0.123***
(0.037)
0.30
747
Models
(3)
0.126***
(0.013)
0.049***
(0.016)
-0.125***
(0.042)
-0.138***
(0.036)
-0.260***
(0.065)
-0.151**
(0.068)
-0.313***
(0.068)
0.096
(0.062)
-0.088
(0.060)
0.46
747
(4)
0.128***
(0.013)
0.045***
(0.016)
-0.116***
(0.042)
-0.124***
(0.036)
-0.248***
(0.064)
-0.146**
(0.068)
-0.307***
(0.068)
0.095
(0.062)
-0.083
(0.059)
-0.067 ***
(0.022)
0.47
747
(5)
0.114***
(0.014)
0,044***
(0.016)
-0.131**
(0.042)
-0.137***
(0.039)
-0.245***
(0.064)
-0.136**
(0.067)
-0.290***
(0.067)
0.100*
(0.061)
-0.086
(0.059)
-0.059 ***
(0.023)
0.162 ***
(0.049)
0.107 ***
(0.036)
0.060
(0.064)
0.51
747
Notes: Coefficients reported represent marginal effects. Reference country is Czech Reptiblic,
and reference industry is Ser\'ices. Level of significance of estimated coefficients is indicated as
follows: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*.
cussed about the processes and their probable effects on union influence.
Eor the U.K. sample, the pattern is as expected: The coefficient of COLL is
positive while the coefficient of CALC is negative; both are highly statistically
significant.
Extensions and Robustness Analysis
We need to consider the possibility that union influence and HRM practices,
as measured by the CALC and COLL scales, are simultaneously determined.
We conceive of union influence as arising from interactive, negotiated pro-
cesses between management and unions. To test and control for simultane-
ity we specify a system of three equations and estimate it by SURE (seemingly
unrelated regression). SURE uses the asymptotically efficient, feasible, GLS
algorithm (described in Greene 2003: 340-362) and jointly estimates the
three regressions, each with its own error term, as errors are allowed to be
correlated. Stepwise expansion of the equation specifications follows the
same pattern as in Tables 4a and 4b. Estimation results for the union influ-
ence equation are reported in Tables 5a and 5b for the PSCs and the U.K.
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Table 5b. Determinants of Union Influence in the
United Kingdom (SUR estimator)
Variables
Firm size
Firm age
Multinational firm
Private firm
Business cycle
Primary industries
Manufacturing
Construction
R_squared
Number observations
(1)
0.102***
(0.013)
0.033**
(0.014)
0.22
800
Models
(2)
0.088***
(0.012)
0.030**
(0.014)
0.067
(0.046)
-0.270***
(0.038)
0.28
800
0.088***
(0.012)
0.030**
(0.014)
0.063
(0.046)
-0.282***
(0.039)
-0.031
(0.022)
0.28
800
(4)
0.103***
(0.012)
0.024*
(0.014)
0.053
(0.045)
-0.296***
(0.040)
-0.024
(0.022)
0.225***
(0.084)
0.252***
(0.038)
0.074
(0.085)
0.38
800
Notes: Coefficients reported represent marginal effects. Reference industiy is
Services. Level of significance of estimated coefficients is: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*.
samples, respectively, while the (auxiliary) results for the HRM practices'
equations are reported in the online version of the paper (Tables A. 3a,
A.3b, A.4a, and A.4b) on http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/8038/. Comparing re-
sults for the determinants of union influence in the United Kingdom and in
the PSCs, the signs of the effects are the same, except for the Multinational
firm variable. The main conclusion we draw from Tables 5a and 5b is that
the coefficients appear very similar to those reported in Tables 4a and 4b,
respectively. The fact that the coefficient signs are the same and the magni-
tudes are very similar suggests that our results are robust. Eurther, a Breusch-
Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan 1980) of independence (no correlation of
residuals) rejects the hypothesis of zero correlation of the residuals and im-
plies that union influence and HRM practices indeed are correlated and
likely to be simultaneously determined.^
As a further robustness check we estimate SURE regressions with a mea-
sure of union presence {TUPR) rather than influence for both samples. Al-
though our main variable of interest is union influence, we consider union
presence a necessary condition and the best proxy for influence (Verma et
al. 2002; Vernon 2006). Therefore, estimating regressions with TUPR can
reveal if there is a gap between (necessary) conditions and realization. The
results are reported in Tables 6a and 6b and appear qualitatively similar to
the results for union influence reported in Tables 5a and 5b. The dependent
Breusch-Pagan Chi-square statistic, a Lagrange Multiplier statistic, rejects the null hypothesis of
no correlation in all regressions and is significant at 1% level or better.
UNION INFLUENCE IN POST-SOCIALIST EUROPE 643
Table 6a. Determinants of Union Presence in the PSCs (SUR
Variables
Eirm size
Firm age
Multinational firm
Private firm
Bulgaria
Hungary
Estonia
Slovenia
Slovakia
Business cycle
Primary industries
Manufacturing
Construction
R_squared
Number observations
(1)
0.479***
(0.052)
0.465***
(0.063)
0.27
680
(2)
0.489***
(0.051)
0.415***
(0.063)
-0.473***
(0.170)
-0.515***
(0.144)
0.34
680
Models
(3)
0.468***
(0.050)
0.312***
(0.059)
-0.403***
(0.157)
-0.559***
(0.134)
-0.412*
(0.242)
-0.267
(0.248)
-1.325***
(0.246)
0.974***
(0.225)
-0.100
(0.218)
0.51
680
(4)
0.418***
(0.050)
0.296***
(0.059)
-0.390***
(0.157)
-0.510***
(0.134)
-0.368
(0.240)
-0.247
(0.247)
-1.299***
(0.245)
0.975***
(0.224)
-0.077
(0.216)
-0.257***
(0.083)
0.52
680
estimator)
(5)
0.393***
(0.050)
0.296***
(0.058)
-0.419***
(0.154)
-0.559***
(0.142)
-0.347
(0.234)
-0.198
(0.240)
-1.206***
(0.238)
1.005***
(0.219)
-0.098
(0.210)
-0.226***
(0.082)
0.969***
(0.174)
0.577***
(0.133)
0.133
(0.242)
0.58
680
Notes: Coefficients reported represent marginal effects. Reference country is Czech Republic,
and reference industry is Services. Level of significance of estimated coefficients is 1%***,
variable, TUPR, is a scale with six categories rather than a dichotomous one,
meaning that the coefficients are not directly comparable in terms of mag-
nitudes.^ The signs of the estimated coefficients are the same, while the co-
efficient magnitudes appear proportionately similar. This qualitative
similarity indicates that the degree of unions' presence likely approximates
their influence.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our main contribution has been to show the antecedents of union influ-
ence at enterprise level in the PSCs. Although both forms of HRM have the
expected associations with union influence, these are more muted than in
the United Kingdom. Union influence is also associated vñth high union
results for the HRM practices equations are reported in the online version of this article (Tables
A.5a, A.5b, A.6a, and A.6b) on http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/8038/ and are quite similar to the SURE results
with union influence.
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Table 6b. Determinants of Union Presence in the
United Kingdom (SUR estimator)
Variables
Firm size
Firm age
Multinational firm
Private firm
Business cycle
Primary industries
Manufacturing
Construction
R_squared
Number observations
(1)
0.319***
(0.046)
0.130***
(0.053)
0.25
800
Models
(2)
0.262***
(0.045)
0.135***
(0.052)
0.210
(0.164)
-0.908***
(0.140)
0.34
800
(3)
0.265***
(0.045)
0.130**
(0.052)
0.189
(0.164)
-0.915***
(0.143)
-0.072
(0.080)
0.34
800
(4)
0.352***
(0.043)
0.082*
(0.049)
0.086
(0.152)
-0.960***
(0.140)
-0.052
(0.075)
0.710**
(0.298)
1.426***
(0.132)
0.064
(0.310)
0.47
800
Notes: Coefficients reported represent marginal effects. Reference industry is
Services. Level of significance of estimated coefficients is 1%***, 5%*
density, negative movements in the business cycle, and institutional speci-
ficities in certain countries. National patterns are broadly anticipated from
nation-level studies, but the relationship between national and enterprise
influence is not entirely symmetrical.
Our attempts to explain our findings originate in the continued and pos-
itive importance of legacy union functions in the PSCs. Unions have certain
positive resources: indirect union influence may derive, particularly among
older workers, from conceptions of the union as welfare provider, and this
may be more relevant than pre-1989 because job security is now hugely re-
duced. It may also reflect continued identification with the union as an in-
stitutional embodiment of tbe labor collective. Collaborative HRM reflects
an approach that is more positive toward institutional forms of employee
voice but its effects, which are weaker than in the United Kingdom, may also
reflect the historic welfare orientation.
The country results confirm that our oudiers in terms of national-level
considerations, Slovenia and Estonia, show high and low enterprise-level
union influence, respectively, and this reflects common estimates of their
national influence. In the national middle range of our sample, union influ-
ence in enterprises is similar iri both parts of the ex-Czechoslovakia despite
Slovakia's relatively highly organized industrial relations (Stockhammer and
Onaran 2009), and this suggests the relevance of these countries' shared
historic legacy.
Extrapolation from national-level estimates of union influence is not
universally valid. The marked weakness of Bulgarian enterprise-level union
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influence is noteworthy. Although consistent with estimates from Global
Union Federations' local projects (ICEM/IUF 2009), this weakness is also
surprising in view of Thirkell et al.'s (1998) earlier judgment and the mod-
est level of transformation in that economy (Lane 2006).
We find a strong relationship between union influence and membership
levels, and this finding supports Verma et al. (2002). Where union density is
zero, the result is hardly surprising since no influence can be expected, but
influence becomes more common with higher density. This may be inter-
preted in different ways, and our no-influence finding may be more useful
than the influence finding, because it is clearer in its meaning. This consti-
tutes a limitation of our analysis because the latter undifferentiated category
may conceal much variation. Conversely, a request for nuanced responses
would introduce a major inter-rater reliability problem. Reaching a nuanced
and context-sensitive assessment of union influence requires case study
work.
Union influence is negatively correlated with the business cycle, espe-
cially in the PSCs, and this is consistent with the thesis that union legal
watchdog and welfare functions remain significant: Employer and worker
demands for these services (especially the former) will likely be higher when
enterprises are in difficulty, and this underlines the continuing significance
of legal requirements that unions must be consulted on redundancies in
some countries (Broughton 2009). The finding is consistent with Bulgarian
findings that the onset of redundancy increases levels of union bargaining
over its terms (Tomev et al. 2008). Private ownership of all types is also nega-
tively associated with union influence. This suggests that private companies,
including MNCs, are establishing employment relationships that tend to
reduce union influence. It also imphes that union influence in state enter-
prises is unlikely to survive further privatization and foreign direct invest-
ment in these countries.
Overall, our findings lend little support to conceptions of convergence in
Europe between East and West. Europe remains in this sense divided.
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Appendix
Table A. la. HRM Practices Scales, PSCs
MSP
Scale/Variable Mean
0.26
0.31
0.40
0.40
0.43
0.62
0.65
0.68
0.69
0.70
0.70
0.73
0.74
0.78
0.78
0.30
0.31
0.37
0.44
0.46
0.50
0.54
0.59
0.64
0.69
0.72
0.72
0.92
H
0.71
0.30
0.77
0.71
0.74
0.74
0.66
0.74
0.81
0.80
0.73
0.74
0.46
0.73
0.30
0.68
0.62
0.30
0.82
0.57
0.30
0.72
0.49
0.48
0.58
0.69
0.55
0.58
0.49
0.70
Alphi
0.78
0.78
0.76
0.76
0.75
0.76
0.77
0.76
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.76
0.77
0.76
0.78
0.78
0.73
0.73
0.70
0.71
0.73
0.70
0.70
0.71
0.71
0.69
0.70
0.70
0.71
0.72
Calculative scale {CALC)
Using compulsory redundancies
Regular formal appraisal for manual workers
Regular formal appraisal for clerical staif
Regular formal appraisal for professionals
Regtilar formal appraisal for managers
Variable pay based on performance for manual workers
Variable pay based on performance for clerical staff
Base pay determined at indiNÍdual level for clerical
Base pay determined at individual level for professionals
Base pay determined at indixndual level for manual workers
Variable pay based on performance for professionals
Formal appraisal used to inform career progress and pay
Variable pay based on performance for managers
In appraisal no input by the employee
Base pay determined at individual level for managers
Collaborative scale (COLL)
Action programme for inclusion of minorities
Formal briefings for manual workers
Non-managerial career development by project team work
Presence of joint consultative committee
Formal briefings for clerical staff
Managerial career development by project team work
Procedure for employees to communicate to managers
Strategy for communication to employees
Formal briefings for professionals
Employee-employer communication by team briefings
Employer-employee communication by team briefings
Written mission and corporate values statement
Formal briefings for managers
. MSP denotes Mokken Scaling Program. H is Loevinger's coefficient of homogeneity (weighted); all
H-coefficients are significantly different from zero at the p= 0.001 level. Alpha is Cronbach's Alpha mea-
sure of reliability for the scale; for each item, the Alpha is for the scale minus the item.
UNION INFLUENCE IN POST-SOCIALIST EUROPE 647
Table A. lb. HRM Practices Scales, United Kingdom
MSP
Scale/Variable
Calculative scale ( CALC)
In appraisal no input by the employee
Using compulsory redundancies
Variable pay based on performance for professionals
Regular formal appraisal for manual workers
Variable pay based on performance for manual workers
Variable pay based on performance for clerical staff
Variable pay based on performance for managers
Regular formal appraisal for clerical staff
Regular formal appraisal for professionals
Regular formal appraisal for managers
Base pay determined at individual level for manual workers
Base pay determined at individual level for clerical
Base pay determined at individual level for professionals
Formal appraisal used to inform career progress and pay
Base pay determined at individual level for managers
Collaborative scale (COLL)
Non-managerial career development by project team work
Action programme for inclusion of minorities
Managerial career development by project team work
Formal briefings for manual workers
Presence of joint consultative committee
Procedure for employees to communicate to managers
Formal briefings for clerical staff
Strategy for communication to employees
Formal briefings for professionals
Written mission and corporate values statement
Employee-employer communication by team briefings
Employer-employee communication by team briefings
Formal briefings for managers
Notes: MSP denotes Mokken Scaling Program. H is Loevinger's coefficient of homogeneity
(weighted); all H<oefficients are significantly different from zero at the p = 0.001 level. Alpha
is Cronbach's Alpha measure of reliability for the scale; for each item, the Alpha is for the scale
minus the item.
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